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Property in Goods and the CISG (2024), S. 256—266 
III. (No) indirect influence on seller’s … 
Till Maier-Lohmann 

256 III. (No) indirect influence on seller’s property after avoidance of contract by the CISG

569

Even though the CISG leaves the applicability of national insolvency law regarding priorities unimpaired, the reasoning presented above1169 does not necessarily mean that there is no indirect influence of the CISG on the allocation of goods in insolvency. On one hand, some national laws might consider the seller never to have parted with the property in the goods if the seller avoids the contract. French law, for example, provides for an automatic re-transfer of property in certain cases of avoidance.1170 Based on the consensual nature of the transfer of property and its natural connection with the sales contract, property is considered to have never passed to the buyer, because the contract ceases to exist ex tunc. There is no explicit rule to this effect (although one may infer it from Article 117 of the Loi n° 85-98 of 25 January 1985 in France), but it follows from the general approach to the transfer of property under these laws. Since there is no sales contract mandating the transfer of property (anymore), property does not pass. Article 117(1) of the Loi n° 85-98 clarifies that the contract has to have been avoided before the insolvency proceedings are opened. On the other hand, the seller may have retained property by a clause in the contract. These two constellations have caused discussions on the potential indirect influence of the CISG on the seller having or relying on property in the goods.

1. Schlechtriem and the causa surviving contract avoidance

570

Schlechtriem reached the result in his analysis that property does not fall back to the seller automatically upon avoidance of the contract under the CISG.1171 He strictly applied the reasoning of consensual property laws and posed the question of whether the sales contract that originally transferred property onto the buyer still exists. This question is considered to be an incidental question in parlance of private international law and is to be answered by the applicable contract law. While, to this day, it is still disputed whether 257 avoidance of a contract under the CISG extinguishes the contract subject to the exceptions in Article 81(1) or whether the contract is merely amended into a reverse transaction, Schlechtriem favored a continued but amended existence of the contract and relied on Article 7(1) of the CISG and its mandate to further the uniformity in the interpretation of the Convention to underpin his argument: Since national laws may differ in terms of remedies available if the seller were to become owner of the goods again, considering the contract to continue to exist in combination with consensual property systems leads to the inapplicability of these remedies and, thus, uniformity.1172 This, in turn, led him to conclude that property does not fall back automatically with avoidance, since national property law must consider the contract to continue to exist, whereby the causa for the original transfer of property remains unimpaired.1173

2. Landfermann, Hornung, Krebs, Claude Witz arguing for the irrelevance of the CISG

571

At the other end of the spectrum, Landfermann, Hornung, Krebs, and Claude Witz have argued that the CISG should not be interpreted to indirectly influence the allocation of property after avoidance under the CISG.1174 First of all, supporters of this opinion highlight the exclusion of the effect the contract has on the property in the goods under Article 4, sentence 2(b) of the CISG and reason that this should also extend to the effect of avoidance, which shifts the question outside the scope of the CISG.1175 Landfermann., moreover, opposes the consequences if one were to consider the CISG to preempt either the automatic retransfer of property or a preemption of claims based on property: A French or Italian judge would have to reach divergent conclusions with regard to who is the owner of the goods depending on whether French law, Italian law, or the CISG was applicable in otherwise completely identical cases.1176 Under this approach, the CISG does not have any effect on the property in case of avoidance. If the applicable national law provides for a system of consensual property transfers, the seller is considered never to have parted with the property upon avoidance.1177

258 3. Discussion

572

While the opinions described focus on the CISG, it is important to note in a first step that the problem raised lies beyond the scope of the Convention. The question rather goes to the core of the interplay between private international law, property law, and contract law. The answer requires an analysis of the interplay between CISG, private international law, and national property law in more depth than the currently expressed opinions under the CISG. Schlechtriem’s opinion is based on undisclosed and incorrect premises.

a) Challenging the premise of the continuing existence of a causa for purposes of national property law as a matter governed by the CISG

573

Schlechtriem relies on Article 7(1) of the CISG even though he acknowledges that the question of whether property falls back is regulated by the lex rei sitae, and is thus outside the scope of the Convention. At the same time, however, he argues that the question of whether a sufficient causa for the transfer of property still exists must be answered by the applicable contract law by way of the national property law referring the question thereto. Even though the effect on property was not “expressly” addressed by the CISG, uniformity and Article 7(1) should prevail.

574

Article 7(1)’s mandate to favor uniform interpretations is limited to the Convention itself (“the need to promote uniformity in its [this Convention’s] application”). The question of whether a sufficient causa exists (or continues to exist) after avoidance of contract is decisive if goods are situated, for example, in France, to assess whether sellers are protected in the buyer’s insolvency due to their property in the goods. If they are not, they would have to get in line with the buyer’s other unsecured creditors, reasonably expecting to be awarded only a fraction of their claim’s value. The question of the seller’s protection in the buyer’s insolvency is neither explicitly nor implicitly addressed by the CISG. Not allowing property to automatically fall back would only serve uniformity from the point of view of legal systems that would not protect the unsecured seller who has transferred the property to the buyer, for example, German and Swiss law. Hence, while the question of whether the avoidance of contract lets the contract cease to exist ex tunc or ex nunc could be answered by relying on Article 7(1) of the CISG, the provision has no effect if the question to be answered falls outside the scope of the CISG. If national property law were to refer this question to the CISG (the second premise that will be discussed below), Article 7(1) would again not be a convincing basis to argue for any result, since its scope remains the scope of the CISG itself: A uniform result will in any case not be reached, since only some national laws would refer the question to the applicable 259 contract law, while others – for example, German law – would decide the question on their own due to the abstractness of the transfer of property from the sales contract.

575

Thus, Article 7(1) of the CISG cannot be raised to argue that property should or should not fall back onto the seller after avoidance of contract. The question should be left completely to national law.

b) Challenging the premise of an incidental question to the applicable contract law

576

The second premise that underlies Schlechtriem’s reasoning is that the applicable (causal or consensual) property law poses an incidental question of whether the contract still exists, and that this is the only gateway through which the avoidance of contract might become relevant.

aa) The correct methodology of incidental questions is not decisive

577

Based on the same premise, Sonnentag has described the whole discussion as revolving around whether the law applicable to the incidental question would have to be found by way of applying the private international law of the forum (selbstständige Vorfrage) or the rules of the private international law of the law applicable to the main question (unselbstständige Vorfrage).1178 While the correct method regarding incidental questions is to this day subject to discussion,1179 it is not decisive here. For this discussion to be relevant, the lex causae would have to be a foreign law for the competent court, since otherwise both methods would apply identical conflict of law rules, and additionally the conflict of law rules of the lex causae and the lex fori would have to lead to different applicable laws.1180 Against the background of most private international laws allowing the parties to choose the law applicable to their contract and, for example, the unification under the Rome I Regulation, the applicable contract law will in most cases be the same irrespective of whether the rules of the lex causae or of the lex fori are applied. Furthermore, it is inaccurate to interpret Landfermann, Hornung, Krebs, and Claude Witz to argue that the solution is to be found in applying the law of the lex causae to the incidental question (unselbstständige Vor 260 frage).1181 They do not advocate applying the conflict of law rules of the lex causae (which is the lex rei sitae to this end), but rather to apply the material rules of the lex causae regarding the question of whether avoidance has an effect vis-à-vis third parties.1182 Thus, the relevant question is not one of methodology of incidental questions within private international law.

bb) Introducing a discussion on the same problem in private international law literature

578

Rather, the question is whether the applicable contract law should be exclusively relied upon to decide the incidental question posed by national property laws, for example, in France. It should be noted that there have been sophisticated discussions on the relevance of contract law in this regard in literature on private international law. These discussions, however, have gone unexamined by literature on the CISG. Niboyet has dedicated a substantial part of a monography to the interplay between contract and property law.1183 He discerned that, for example, under Article 1138 of the French Civil Code old version1184 for property to pass, four requirements would have to be fulfilled in line with Article 1108 of the French Civil Code old version: consentement, capacité, objet and cause licite.1185 Yet, French property law does not indicate which law applies to determine whether these requirements are fulfilled; the law applicable to these questions must be found by applying conflict of law rules.1186 Later, Niboyet even went further and argued that these questions should de lege ferenda be answered entirely by the lex rei sitae.1187 The main discussion that his analysis caused was on the question of whether the validity of the sales contract for purposes of the transfer of property was subject to the applicable contract law, the rules on validity of the legal system that was applicable to property, or a combination of both.1188

261

579

Nevertheless, also the consequences of a contract avoidance and whether the intent to transfer property can be rescinded have been touched upon in the periphery of the main discussion. Niboyet has argued that applying the rules of other fields of law of the lex rei sitae (specifically contract law) to the requirements posed by the lex rei sitae would lead to a desirable uniformity in cases of avoidance of contract.1189 Lalive also favors an interpretation regarding the comparable Article 1543 of the Quebec Civil Code old version and argues that the proprietary effect of the contract’s dissolution should be left to the lex rei sitae.1190 Zaphiriou follows Bartin in arguing that one has to distinguish between the sales contract and the consensual element of the transfer of property.1191 While the sales contract is governed by the applicable contract law, the consensual element is subject to the lex rei sitae.1192 This specifically extends to the question of whether the consensual element is annulled or rescinded, for example, by avoidance of contract.1193 Rabel’s remarks can be understood to be in line with the latter approach.1194

580

The arguments that, for example, Privat has raised against this approach are aimed at the relevance of validity of the contract under the lex contractus and the lex rei sitae and, thus, not directly at effects of an avoidance of contract. Nevertheless, his criticism of the approach of Lalive and Zaphiriou is correct as far as he criticizes that it assumes a consensual element in French property law distinguishable from the consensual contractual element.1195 Echoing Privat’s analysis, most scholars in the German-speaking regions have argued that in causal property systems, all questions of consent and existence of contract should, by way of an incidental question, be left to the applicable contract law.1196

cc) Contrat translatif as a requirement under the national property law

581

In my opinion, property laws in both causal and consensual systems indeed encompass incidental questions concerning consent: Whether a contract has been concluded is determined by the applicable contract law. Also, it goes 262 without saying that the contract is governed by the applicable contract law, including the question of under which circumstances the contract can be avoided. For example, French property law requires the contract to be of translative character, as is evidenced by Article 1196(1) of the French Civil Code.1197 The question of whether the contract as it exists under the applicable contract law at the relevant point in time exhibits the characteristics of what French law would consider a sufficient basis to transfer property, should be considered relevant for the requirement under the French property law as the lex rei sitae. Thus, if French law considers a sales contract avoided by the seller due to the buyer’s failed payment as no longer exhibiting these characteristics, there is no longer a contrat translatif (a contract with proprietary effect)1198 which would allow considering the buyer to never have become the owner of the goods. This effect is, hence, due to national property law and is independent from the question of whether the applicable law, for example the CISG, considers avoidance of a contract to have retroactive effect or not. If, in a causal legal system like Swiss law, the contract is considered sufficiently intact after avoidance for purposes of property law as to maintain that the property has passed,1199 there is again no need to revert to the applicable contract law in this regard. The results reached under this approach mirror the opinions of Landfermann, Hornung, Krebs, and Claude Witz under the CISG.

582

In contrast to the approach favored by Schlechtriem, this interpretation avoids a disadvantage that has been pointed out by Niboyet in the parallel discussion: Under Schlechtriem’s approach, the buyer would not become the owner of the goods after avoidance of the contract but would have to transfer property concurrently against repayment of the price under Article 81(2) of the CISG. Yet, for example, French law does not regulate how the buyer could retransfer the property, since the law does not provide for separate real contracts or abstract contracts to transfer property.1200

583

Moreover, leaving the question of whether avoidance of contract has retroactive effect to the applicable contract law is destined to cause haphazard outcomes: This is because the applicable contract law might have been drafted without any consequences for property law in mind. The consequences 263 of an avoidance of a contract for property are a case in point: The idea of a Rückgewährschuldverhältnis was created in Germany, a country that considers the contract and the transfer of property generally to be separate from one another (Abstraktionsprinzip). The Rückgewährschuldverhältnis was first and foremost meant to overcome problems with damage claims after avoidance of a contract and not for implications on the property in the goods (since the questions as to whether a contract ceased to exist ex tunc or ex nunc was and is in principle completely irrelevant for questions of property under German law).1201 The spirit of the incidental question of whether rather the seller or the buyer should be protected by remaining the owner of the goods is, thus, completely missed by some applicable contract laws, such as for example, German law. On a similar note, this could also explain why the delegates did not find it necessary to decide whether a contract under the CISG can be avoided with retroactive effect,1202 since effects on property were excluded from the CISG under Article 4, sentence 2(b).

584

A practical illustration of the haphazard results stems from the example of German and French sellers that conclude identical sales contracts with a French buyer. Yet, one contract is subject to German law, while the other is governed by French law. The goods are delivered to the buyer in France, and it becomes evident that he or she might not be able to pay. Both sellers rightfully avoid their respective contract under the respectively applicable contract law. Subsequently, the buyer becomes insolvent. Applying the opinion that makes property dependent on whether the contract still exists or whether it ceased to exist ex tunc under the applicable contract law, the French seller would be considered the owner of the goods, while the German seller would not.1203 There is no material reason under French insolvency or French property law why a seller under a different contract law should (without further agreements between the parties) be treated less favorably. Landfermann has rightfully pointed out that this result would startle an Italian or French judge.1204

585

French law could have also regulated the protection of the unpaid seller who avoids the contract before insolvency in insolvency law.1205 The fact that it indirectly placed the rule in contract law due to its overall causal system 264 should not obscure the view that this rule is in effect a protection in insolvency. The location of the rule is more due to a national lawmaker’s view that its legal system is a unit, while the impact that such a rule might have after a fragmentation into different applicable laws in international cases is less at the forefront of his or her thinking.1206 The seller’s protection by relapse of property was especially necessary in France, because during the time it was developed, the French legal system did not allow retention of property clauses to have an effect on property in the goods.1207 The principle of causality and consensus that subordinates the property law to contract law should not be taken so strictly as to override the relevance of the allocation of property in insolvency. There is no reason why an abstract property system, such as German law, should be privileged in deciding according to national standards when property passes even in international cases,1208 while causal systems are required to adhere to the consequences of a foreign contract law that might never have been checked in this regard since national law does not link such consequences to the (merely obligatory) contract.

586

Also, German and Swiss scholars may have sympathy for this interpretation since it results in the contract avoidance not having retroactive effect. This is a consequence they are familiar with due to their own national laws. However, if one were to take the interpretation literally, it could produce very different results, too. If goods were situated in Switzerland but the respective sales contract was subject to French contract law, the avoidance of the contract would lead to its non-existence ex tunc. The applicable causal Swiss property law would under the interpretation in question find that no contract exists, and the property has never passed from the seller to the buyer. Thus, even if one follows the approach under Swiss law that avoidance of a (national) sales contract should not lead to the automatic relapse of property,1209 this would nevertheless result if French contract law applied. It cannot be assumed that a causal property system gives up its reign over 265 such a central property question for the lex rei sitae just to stay true to the principle of causality.

587

These issues can be avoided by preserving the principle of causality and addressing the question of contract existence through the applicable contract law by way of an incidental question. Yet, whether this contract exhibits the characteristics of a contract that effects a transfer of property is left to the applicable lex rei sitae. In contrast to what Privat has argued, this approach does not apply two different laws to the contract and, thereby, does not split up the contract under two diverging laws.1210 Rather, the question of whether the contract is a contrat translatif is without relevance for contract law and its supremacy over the contract between the parties. Moreover, the interpretation does not contradict the opinion of the Comité français de droit international privé that Privat cites to argue that the applicable contract law should assume these kinds of questions altogether. He cites Article 89 of the “avant-projet de réforme du Code Civil” and the accompanying comments to argue that “contrats relatifs à la constitution ou à la transmission d’un droit réel sur un meuble” should also be subject to the law chosen by the parties.1211 Yet, this Article only envisaged the obligatory effects of the contract (“les contrats sont soumis, en ce qui concerne [...] leurs effets obligatoires”).1212 The accompanying discussion that Privat cites concerned the suitability of applying the lex rei sitae to the obligatory effects of the contract if the parties have not chosen an applicable law.1213 This is not a convincing basis upon which to argue whether or not the law applicable to the contract should have an impact on property, or should have relevance by way of incidental questions from the applicable lex rei sitae.

c) Advantages of the proposed interpretation for the CISG

588

Although the question discussed here should not be influenced by the CISG as discussed above,1214 the interpretation proposed here would clear the path for more international consensus and uniformity in the understanding of the consequences of avoidance under Articles 81–84. It is to this day disputed whether the contract under the CISG generally ceases to exist ex tunc with Article 81(1), sentence 2 of the CISG representing the exception of parts of the contract that survive the avoidance, or whether the contract continues to exist with this provision only stating the obvious. While it can rightfully be asked what practical differences are caused by the divergent interpretations 266 and whether this discussion is, hence, even worth having,1215 excluding the possibility that this discussion has an effect on property may limit the discussion to even fewer consequences and, thus, increase the odds of finding international consensus. This would further the objectives sought by Article 7(1) of the CISG, whereas Landfermann’s approach to leave the question of whether the contract avoidance has retroactive effects entirely to national law1216 would jeopardize this uniformity.

4. Summary

589

There is no indirect influence of the CISG on the seller’s property after avoidance of contract. In legal systems that link the transfer of property causally to the conclusion of the contract, there can be an incidental question as to whether a contract exists that is subject to the applicable contract law. However, whether this existing contract exhibits the characteristics of a contract that suffices under national law to transfer property has to be left to the lex rei sitae. The transfer based on the principle of causality should not be granted the status of a master in its own right to the detriment of national property and insolvency laws.

1169 See above paras. 565 et seq.
1170 For France, including the assessment that this has not been changed by the 2016 reform of the French Civil Code, Meier, 80 RabelsZ (2016), 851, 885; Hellenringer, pp. 207, 211. Similarly under Italian law, Art. 1458(1) Italian Civil Code, Landfermann, Sicherungen des vorleistenden Verkäufers, pp. 114–115. Cf. Jansen/Zimmermann/Hellwege, Art. 9:305 para. 13.
1171 Schlechtriem, Internationales UN-Kaufrecht, para. 330. This approach has found approval from Schroeter, Internationales UN-Kaufrecht, para. 897; Schlechtriem/P. Butler, para. 330; Schlechtriem/Schwenzer/Schroeter/Fountoulakis, 7th German edn, Vorbemerkungen zu Artt. 81–84 para. 4 (the respective sentences were deleted in the 8th German edn); Sonnentag, pp. 256–257.
1172 Schlechtriem, Internationales UN-Kaufrecht, para. 330.
1173 Schlechtriem, Internationales UN-Kaufrecht, para. 330.
1174 Landfermann, Auflösung des Vertrages, pp. 133–134 (his reasoning is based on the ULIS but remains applicable under the CISG); Hornung, p. 116; Krebs, p. 53; Cl. Witz, paras. 114.81, 358.41.
1175 Hornung, p. 116; Krebs, p. 53.
1176 Landfermann, Auflösung des Vertrages, p. 133. This reasoning is supported by Hornung, p. 116.
1177 Landfermann, Auflösung des Vertrages, pp. 133–134 (his reasoning is based on the ULIS but remains applicable under the CISG); Hornung, p. 116; Krebs, p. 53.
1178 Sonnentag, pp. 254–257.
1179 For English law, see for example, Collins/Harris, paras. 2-044 et seq.; for European and German law, MüKoBGB/v. Hein, Einleitung zum Internationalen Privatrecht para. 181.
1180 MüKoBGB/v. Hein, Einleitung zum Internationalen Privatrecht para. 181 who lists these prerequisites with the remark that the relevance of the discussion on the correct method is limited.
1181 But see Sonnentag, pp. 254–255.
1182 Hornung, p. 116; Krebs, p. 53. Slightly differently, Landfermann, Auflösung des Vertrages, pp. 133–134 who argues that national law should decide whether the contractual obligations cease to exist ex tunc or ex nunc.
1183 Niboyet, L’acquisition de la propriété, pp. 123–185.
1184 A comparable rule is found in today’s Art. 1196(1) French Civil Code.
1185 Niboyet, L’acquisition de la propriété, p. 150. Today’s Art. 1128 lists only three: consentement, capacité and contenu licite et certain. Most notably, the cause has been dropped as an explicit requirement, cf. generally on the cause (and its potentially enduring relevance) under the reformed French Civil Code, Deshayes/Genicon/Laithier, 13 European Review of Contract Law (2017), 418.
1186 Niboyet, L’acquisition de la propriété, pp. 152–155.
1187 Niboyet, Traité IV, pp. 260, 368 et seq.
1188 Cf. the elaborations by Privat, p. 92; Sovilla, p. 39; Stadler, Verkehrsschutz durch Abstraktion, p. 662; Ritterhoff, pp. 120–125; Bornheim, 36, 52–53. For example, Zitelmann, p. 362 favors a cumulative application of the lex contractus and the lex rei sitae and would deny a transfer of property if the contract was invalid under either one of these two laws. This approach is supported by Sovilla, p. 39.
1189 Niboyet, Traité IV, p. 260.
1190 Lalive, pp. 143–144.
1191 Zaphiriou, p. 70.
1192 Zaphiriou, p. 70.
1193 Zaphiriou, p. 70.
1194 Rabel, Conflict of Laws, p. 36.
1195 Privat, p. 92.
1196 Staudinger/Mansel, Art. 43 EGBGB paras. 792, 793; MüKoBGB/Wendehorst, Art. 43 EGBGB para. 86.
1197 Art. 1196(1) French Civil Code: “Dans les contrats ayant pour objet l’aliénation de la propriété ou la cession d’un autre droit, le transfert s’opère lors de la conclusion du contrat.”
1198 Hellenringer, pp. 207, 210.
1199 See Huguenin, OR AT/BT, paras. 2662–2664; Honsell, OR BT, pp. 119–120; Swiss Supreme Court, 16 May 1988, BGE 114 II 152 (with regard to Art. 109 Swiss Code of Obligations); leaving open the question of whether this can be generalized, Swiss Supreme Court, 3 May 2011, BGE 137 III 243 para. 4.4.7; contra, BK/Giger, Art. 208 OR para. 9; Keller/Siehr, p. 88.
1200 Niboyet, Traité IV, p. 260.
1201 Cf. Jaeger, AcP 213 (2013), 507, 512.
1202 Cf. Landfermann, Auflösung des Vertrages, p. 133 on the lack of decision regarding the effect of avoidance under the ULIS, which was not discussed again under the auspices of UNCITRAL.
1203 Under German law, avoidance of contract due to non-payment only amends the contractual relationship.
1204 Landfermann, Auflösung des Vertrages, p. 133.
1205 Cf. Schlechtriem/Coen/Hornung, 9 European Review of Private Law (2001), 377, 387–388 who state that the question whether it is a proprietary (or “title-based”) claim is one of labels, while the substantive question is “in what circumstances should a restitutionary claim be so strong as to have priority over competing claims by other creditors?”.
1206 Cf. Hellinger, pp. 207, 208 who highlights that the regulation of proprietary effects of contracts in the Book on contracts within the French Civil Code has historical reasons.
1207 Cf. Kieninger, p. 255.
1208 Cf. German Supreme Court, 20 July 2012 – V ZR 135/11, BeckRS 2012, 17500, para. 30 where it was found that German law ultimately decided whether the contractual consensus under a foreign law suffices to effect consequences in property law.
1209 See Huguenin, OR AT/BT, paras. 2662–2664; Honsell, OR BT, pp. 119–120; Swiss Supreme Court, 16 May 1988, BGE 114 II 152 (with regard to Art. 109 Swiss Code of Obligations); leaving open the question of whether this can be generalized, Swiss Supreme Court, 3 May 2011, BGE 137 III 243 para. 4.4.7; contra, BK/Giger, Art. 208 OR para. 9; Keller/Siehr, p. 88.
1210 Privat, p. 92.
1211 Privat, pp. 93–94 citing Comité français de droit international privé, Codification, pp. 27–28, 211 et seq.
1212 Comité français de droit international privé, Codification, p. 27.
1213 Comité français de droit international privé, Codification, p. 212.
1214 See above paras. 573 et seq.
1215 See Mohs, Effects of avoidance and restitution of the goods, pp. 252, 255.
1216 Landfermann, Auflösung des Vertrages, p. 133.
 
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